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Abstract 
In the light of current controversy about the nature of intrusions in posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), the review by Brewin (2013) is timely and important. It will undoubtedly stimulate 
further research and guide researchers’ quests for understanding the nature of flashbacks in 
PTSD. In this commentary, I briefly summarize and discuss key points made by Brewin and 
elaborate on some of the reasons behind the controversy. For example, the terms “involuntary 
autobiographical memories,” “intrusive memories,” and “flashbacks” are often used 
interchangeably. I propose a taxonomy revealing the key differences across these forms of 
memory. If flashbacks are characteristic of PTSD patients only, then it is essential that more 
research targeting this population is conducted with a variety of methods. Finally, some new 
avenues for research to study intrusive memories and flashbacks in PTSD, using a diary method 
and modified trauma film paradigm, are described. 
 
 
Keywords: Involuntary autobiographical memories, intrusive memories, flashbacks, hotspots, 
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Solving the mystery of intrusive flashbacks in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Comment on 
Brewin (2013)  
Research on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has yielded important insights over the 
past 10 years, especially with respect to intrusive memories and flashbacks, which constitute a 
key symptom of this debilitating disorder. Given the complexity of the phenomenon, a variety of 
approaches and methods have been used ranging from interview/questionnaire studies of 
intrusive memories in clinical and non-clinical samples, to analysis of trauma narratives in 
PTSD patients and experimental analogue studies in non-clinical samples (trauma-film 
paradigm). This research has been instrumental in testing and developing influential theories, 
enhancing our understanding of mechanisms involved in the formation and maintenance of 
recurrent intrusions in PTSD, and contributing to various therapeutic approaches in clinical 
practice. 
In parallel, independent of this research, remarkable progress has also been achieved in a 
new area of cognitive psychology on involuntary (non-intrusive) autobiographical memories in 
(mostly) non-clinical population, with numerous publications and several books on the topic 
since the publication of a pioneering study by Berntsen (1996). Recently, researchers of 
involuntary autobiographical memory and mainstream cognitive psychology have started to 
question some of the findings and theoretical assumptions of clinical research on intrusive 
memories in PTSD. 
In the light of current controversy about the nature of intrusive memories in PTSD, the 
review article by Brewin (2013) is both important and timely. The major contribution of this 
review to the literature on intrusive memories and more generally to cognitive psychology, as I 
see it, is (a) making a very strong and convincing case for the existence of perceptually-based 
memory representation system that can be accessed both non-consciously (implicitly) and 
consciously (explicitly), and (b) situating research on intrusive phenomena and their theoretical 
explanations within the context of normal cognitive processes. It is essential, however, as 
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pointed out by Brewin (2013), that we “consider how ordinary memory mechanisms may 
operate under usual and unusual circumstances” (p. XX). In other words, we need to explore the 
variables that modulate the operation of these normal processes in response to extreme levels of 
stress experienced by patients during traumatic events to explain the highly intrusive and 
repetitive nature of flashbacks and other clinical phenomena such as nightmares, hypervigilance, 
and partial and/or temporary amnesia for details of the traumatic event, as described in clinical 
cases. We also need to explain why repeated exposure to these highly distressing memories 
results in disappearance rather than increase of intrusions and other symptoms of PTSD.    
My aim is to briefly summarize the key points of Brewin (2013), elaborate on reasons 
behind the controversy, discuss some of the challenges faced by research on intrusive memories 
in general and PTSD in particular, and outline possible avenues for future research in this area. 
Summary of Key Points  
 Long- term Perceptual Memory System 
  Brewin (2013) brings together several different streams of research within cognitive 
and clinical psychology to support the existence of a long-term memory system that 
automatically encodes sensory perceptual information, and may sometimes operate separately 
from the more language-based episodic and autobiographical memory systems postulated by 
current theories of memory. Although the existence of implicit memory and priming and its 
underlying Perceptual Representation Memory System is now textbook material in cognitive 
psychology, the basic assumption, until recently, has been that this system manifests itself non-
consciously (implicitly) in behavioral responses (e.g., reaction times or word stem completions) 
and that its effects are relatively short lived, not lasting longer than few minutes, hours, or days, 
depending on the tasks and materials used. However, evidence reviewed by Brewin provides 
support for the idea that not only does the encoding of low-level perceptual minutiae occur 
automatically but that this information can subsequently be retrieved in the form of conscious 
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intrusive images and memories in the presence of some potent cues, even after long periods of 
delay. 
Evidence emerging from SenseCam research concerning long-term retention of everyday 
minutiae--including one’s own thoughts (which are notoriously difficult to remember, e.g., 
Brewer, 1988)--is promising and can potentially change current theories of episodic and 
autobiographical memories (e.g., see Conway, 2009). Further evidence, not reviewed in the 
target article, comes from initial research on involuntary semantic memories or mind-pops in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples, which shows that even briefly encountered novel 
information (e.g., a street name seen in passing) may later pop into one’s mind sometimes even 
without person’s conscious knowledge that this information had been encountered 
(Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Elua, Laws & Kvavilashvili, 2012). This type of memory 
representations were referred to as “free radicals” by Tulving (1983), who proposed that they 
had not been integrated into either episodic or semantic memory systems and, hence, represented 
more of an anomaly than a standard mode of operation. In contrast, Brewin proposed (2013) the 
existence of long-term perceptually based memory system that is crucial in the production of 
various consciously experienced involuntary phenomena, including the intrusive memories and 
flashbacks in PTSD. 
 Dissociation between Long-term Perceptual and Language-based Memory Systems 
  Dissociations between implicit and explicit memory are well documented in cognitive 
memory research. Brewin (2013) reviews additional evidence from cognitive psychology that 
shows dissociations between the two systems (e.g., on verbal overshadowing or using 
SenseCam). In relation to PTSD intrusions, Brewin summarizes findings from both experimental 
and correlational studies, which have used the trauma-film paradigm asking participants to 
record subsequent intrusions and testing participants’ episodic memory for scenes in the trauma 
film. Meta-analysis of these studies reveal that the number of recorded film intrusions do not 
correlate with performance on episodic memory tasks, which measure the retention of film 
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content. Furthermore, although manipulations of concurrent activities during the film affected 
the number of recorded intrusions, the group differences were not usually mirrored by similar 
differences in episodic memory tasks as shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4 (for a particularly interesting 
dissociation, see Krans, Näring, Holmes & Becker, 2009).  
 Nature of Voluntary (Narrative) Memory of Traumatic Events in PTSD 
  A review of the literature, presented by Brewin (2013) on impaired voluntary memory 
for trauma (one of the key symptoms of PTSD according to the DSM criteria), shows that all 
those studies in which trauma narratives were independently judged by raters provide support 
for clinical observations of increased fragmentation or disorganization of trauma narratives. In 
contrast, those studies that asked participants themselves to rate these aspects of their trauma 
memory (using one or two items in a questionnaire) did not find any such effects. It is therefore 
concluded that the results obtained will depend on the method used and that the judges’ ratings 
are more objective and preferable to participants’ own ratings. It is, however, obvious that it will 
be very difficult to achieve consensus on this contentious issue. Indeed, it is difficult to study 
empirically the type of disorganization/fragmentation and partial or even complete amnesia for 
aspects of trauma event reported in clinical case studies of PTSD, especially if researchers use 
non-clinical or non-PTSD populations, who do not experience such symptoms.  
 Effects of Visuospatial and Verbal Concurrent Tasks on Subsequent Intrusions 
The Dual Representation Theory assumes two separate and relatively independent routes 
to the formation and recalling of trauma memories: the long-term perceptually based 
visuospatial representation system and the language based conceptual memory system (Brewin, 
Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). It is assumed that concurrent visuospatial and verbal tasks at the 
time of encoding tap into these two systems separately and produce modality-specific 
interference with contrasting effects on subsequent intrusions and flashbacks. In particular, if a 
person engages in a secondary task taxing his or her visuospatial system, this performance will 
interfere with the automatic formation of perceptual images of trauma and result in reduction of 
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subsequent trauma-related intrusions. In contrast, engagement in a concurrent verbal activity 
would interfere with the processes occurring in the language-based memory system. Although 
logically this should lead to some impairment of person’s voluntary narrative of the trauma 
event (perhaps making it less coherent and/or incomplete), the main and somewhat 
counterintuitive prediction of the theory is that concurrent verbal tasks enhance processing in 
visuospatial perceptual system, which will result in increased number of subsequent intrusions 
compared to no task control.  
Brewin (2013) provides a comprehensive review of empirical studies that directly test 
the key predictions of the Dual Representation Theory using traumatic film clips and 
manipulating the nature of concurrent tasks in non-clinical samples. He provides strong support 
for the idea that visuospatial tasks presented during or after the trauma film, such as complex 
tapping task or the game Tetris, reliably reduce the number of recorded film intrusions in 
comparison to control conditions (without or with other concurrent tasks). Of particular interest 
are recent studies that managed to obtain these results by engaging participants in visuospatial 
tasks 30 minutes or several hours after watching the film (Deeprose, Zhang, DeJong, Dalgleish, 
& Holmes, 2012; Holmes, James, Kilford, & Deeprose, 2010). 
However, one problem is that the majority of relevant studies have used relatively 
complex visuospatial tasks, which should also engage, to a certain degree, the central executive 
component of Working Memory system.  Hence, it is not entirely clear whether the reduction of 
intrusions is due to selective engagement of the visuospatial sketchpad, the central executive, or 
both. For example, growing research examining the role of eye movements, while a person holds 
an image of negative and/or intrusive memory in mind, shows that engaging visuospatial system 
in this way has beneficial effects in the direction predicted by the Dual Representation Theory 
(Gunter & Bodner, 2008; Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farell, & Holmes, 2009). However, 
this research has also shown that eye movements tax the central executive by reducing 
performance on a concurrent reaction time task (van den Hout, Engelhard, Rijkeboer, 
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Koekebakker, Hornsvel, Leer et al., 2011). Could it be, therefore, that asking participants to 
generate random numbers, a task that taps primarily into central executive resources, will 
produce the same amount of reduction in intrusions as complex tapping task or the Tetris game? 
Recent findings by Pearson and Sawyer (2011) seem to provide initial support for this 
conjecture, even though they used emotional pictures instead of a trauma film (which could have 
affected the results, as pointed out by Brewin, 2013).  However, Isaacs (2004) has reported 
similar results using the so- called Numerical Distraction Therapy with 26 PTSD patients who, 
as part of their therapy session, had to hold in mind their intrusive images while simultaneously 
completing a demanding counting task (counting backwards in 2s from 10 to 0 and then up to 10 
again). It is clear that more systematic research is needed to address this important question.  
In contrast to research on concurrent visual tasks, evidence concerning concurrent verbal 
tasks within the trauma film paradigm is mixed and appears to depend on the nature of 
concurrent tasks used. Two separate analyses were reported by Brewin (2013).  The analyses of 
seven studies that used counting backwards in 3s or 7s showed that the concurrent verbal task 
resulted in a statistically significant increase in the number of film intrusions in two studies, a 
non-significant trend in the predicted direction in three studies, and a non-significant trend in the 
opposite direction (verbal task reducing intrusions in comparison to no task control) in two other 
studies. Although the overall effect, using meta-analytic procedures on these seven studies, came 
out as significant, it is obvious that the findings are not as straightforward as they have been 
with concurrent visuospatial tasks. Moreover, a separate but similar analysis of those five studies 
that used different verbal tasks (e.g., simple counting or remembering a 9-digit number) resulted 
in non-significant effects. 
It is interesting that simple counting or holding a 9-digit number engages primarily the 
phonological loop, whereas counting backwards by 3s and 7s requires additional central 
executive resources, as they impair performance on simple reaction time tasks (van den Hout, 
Engelhard, Smeets, Hornsveld, Hoogeveen, de Heer, et al. 2010). Therefore, it is unclear to what 
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extent the effects predicted by the Dual Representation Theory concerning concurrent verbal 
tasks also relate to engaging the central executive in addition to modality specific verbal 
processes within the phonological loop. It is also interesting that more cognitively based theories 
would predict that engaging verbal processes and counting backwards in 3s and 7s should 
decrease rather than increase subsequent intrusions and distress associated with them, as was 
indeed reported Isaacs (2004) (see also Pearson & Sawyer, 2011; van den Hout et al., 2010). It is 
therefore important that future research systematically compares the predictions of the Dual 
Representation Theory and general theories of cognitive load and working memory, using a 
trauma-film paradigm with both analogue and clinical samples (see below). One potential issue 
that arises in relation to this paradigm, as with research on involuntary phenomena in general, is 
that there is a large variability in the number of recorded film intrusions, which can range from 0 
to over 30 per participant (e.g., see Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy, 2004). The data are therefore 
non-normally distributed and may be affected by one or two outliers in some but not other 
conditions. Consequently, it is important to examine such data for outliers and if necessary, 
exclude them from analyses or use statistical procedures that are sensitive to the (almost always) 
non-normal distribution of intrusion errors.  
Reasons Behind the Controversy 
Several important reasons underlying the nearly continuous debates between clinical and 
cognitive psychologists are discussed by Brewin (2013). Here, I would like to elaborate on 
several additional issues, which in my view, have also contributed to the controversy and 
confusion about intrusive memories in PTSD. 
Problems with Terminology and Definition of Intrusive Memories 
A key problem is confusion about the terminology used, and what is actually studied, 
involuntary autobiographical memories, intrusive memories, or flashbacks. These terms are 
often used interchangeably even though they refer to different phenomena. According to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), the PTSD diagnosis requires 
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that “the traumatic event is persistently re-experienced” (Criterion B), which may consist of 
“recurrent and distressing recollections of the event” (B1), and/or “acting or feeling as if the 
traumatic event was recurring (includes the sense or reliving the experience, illusions, 
hallucinations and dissociative flashback episodes)” (B3). From this description, it is obvious 
that the types of intrusive recollections described as B1 and B3 are quite different. Although B1 
refers to what is typically called ‘intrusive memories,’ which are also experienced by general 
population and people with clinical disorders (e.g., patients with depression), B3 refers to a very 
special type of intrusive phenomena, associated with an intense sense of current threat (as if the 
trauma is recurring) and involves, in extreme cases, complete loss of sense of current reality and 
control of one’s situation.1 These flashbacks appear to be a key characteristic feature of PTSD 
only (Brewin et al., 1996; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998).  
Despite these important differences between intrusive memories and flashbacks, many 
published studies use these terms interchangeably. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that 
in some studies researchers have started using the term “involuntary autobiographical memory” 
when referring to intrusive memories and vice versa (e.g., Brewin, 1998; Bywaters, Andrade, 
Turpin, 2004; Deeprose et al., 2012), presumably because intrusiveness is equated with the 
spontaneity of recall. 
By clear definition of each of these concepts, confusion and controversy can be greatly 
reduced. Indeed, involuntary autobiographical memories are memories of past events that pop 
into mind unexpectedly without any attempt to recall anything, often in response to external or 
internal triggers.  They may affect one’s current mood (Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Kvavilashvili & 
Schlagman, 2011). They may refer to positive, negative, or completely neutral events such as 
remembering one’s first romantic kiss, a car accident, or bumping into a neighbor at a 
supermarket. In contrast, intrusive memories are spontaneous involuntary memories of a 
(mostly) negative event, which repeatedly intrude upon consciousness, often against one’s will, 
are hard to control, and may disrupt one’s ongoing activities. Although these intrusive memories 
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may sometimes be of positive events (e.g., Brewin, Christodoulides, & Hutchinson, 1996; 
Bywaters et al., 2004), they are predominantly negative and disturbing.  
Although ordinary involuntary autobiographical memories and intrusive memories are 
similar in terms of their spontaneous nature, they are different in a number of ways. Indeed, 
everyday involuntary autobiographical memories are random, one-off memories, which pop into 
mind only once or twice and may never be recalled again, whereas the key feature of intrusive 
memories is their repetitive nature, so that a particular memory or image keeps coming back and 
disturbing the individual. Moreover, everyday involuntary autobiographical memories, even if 
negative, do not normally disrupt ongoing activities. Often, it is hard to even notice them, as 
they form part of a normal stream of consciousness and do not stay in mind for longer than few 
seconds. Of importance, they do not involve active avoidance attempts, which is one of the key 
features of intrusive memories.  
It is even more important to distinguish clearly intrusive memories and trauma 
flashbacks in PTSD (see Brewin et al., 1996; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Although intrusive 
memories can in principle be about a positive or a negative event, this is not the case for 
flashbacks, which by definition refer to traumatic events involving high levels of intense fear, 
helplessness, and horror (e.g., when being threatened by a knife and raped, witnessing death or 
causing someone’s death, etc.). The most important difference between the two lies in the nature 
of reliving of the event in memory. Even though intrusive memories often induce bodily 
reactions and feelings associated with the original event, the person is still aware of this being a 
recollective experience or “mental time travel” that is characteristic of autobiographical 
memories in general. In contrast, the re-experiencing in flashbacks is different from reliving in 
intrusive memories as it involves an overwhelming sense of “nowness” accompanied by a strong 
startle response and high degrees physiological arousal. As a result, Brewin et al. (1996) 
characterized flashbacks more as spontaneous re-enactments than as just reliving of trauma (p. 
671). One of the difficulties of distinguishing intrusive memories from flashbacks is that 
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flashbacks can vary “from relatively mild (there is a transient sense of event re-occurring in the 
present) to severe (the person loses all connection with his or her current self and surroundings 
while re-experiencing the memory)” (p. 211, Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). 
The three types of memories described above can be presented on a continuum with 
involuntary autobiographical memories and flashbacks occupying its opposite poles and 
intrusive memories in the middle, sharing some features with each (see Figure 1). The important 
question that arises is whether the difference between intrusive memories and flashbacks 
(especially the relatively mild ones with only transient sense of nowness) is quantitative or 
qualitative. According to clinical research and the Dual Representation Theory, the difference is 
qualitative, whereas cognitive psychologists argue that it is quantitative (Berntsen, 2001; Rubin, 
Boales & Berntsen, 2008). Answering this important question is difficult but not impossible. It 
may require more targeted behavioral studies on PTSD participants (see below) as well as input 
from fMRI and lesion studies (e.g., Koenigs & Grafman, 2009; Whalley, Kroes, Huntley, Rugg, 
Davis & Brewin, 2013). 
Problems with Studying PTSD Flashbacks in Analogue Studies       
Clinical observations and case studies suggest that PTSD patients have a small number 
of recurring images and/or memories about their trauma, only a few of which have the qualities 
of flashback type re-enactment/re-experiencing that is specifically characteristic of PTSD (e.g., 
Holmes, Grey & Young, 2005). Therefore, the existing controversy may also be related to the 
implicit assumption that the Dual Representation Theory was proposed to explain all intrusions 
in PTSD rather than a relatively small subset of them (i.e., flashbacks). 
However, Brewin et al. (1996) clearly distinguished two types of intrusive memories in 
PTSD. (1) Intrusive memories, which are essentially part of normal autobiographical memory 
system and can be recalled both deliberately in the form of trauma narrative and as recurrent 
intrusive memories (see also Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Such intrusive memories are often 
associated with secondary emotions of sadness, anger, or guilt and can occur in the general 
                                                                                     Intrusive flashbacks in PTSD 13 
population and other clinical samples (e.g., people with depression). (2) In contrast, flashbacks 
can only be recalled involuntarily, in response to internal or external triggers, and consist 
predominantly of visual perceptual images. 
If intrusive trauma memories and flashbacks are distinguished in this way, there appears 
to be no real contradiction between general cognitive theories of autobiographical memory and 
the Dual Representation Theory, as they are simply trying to explain different types of 
phenomena. This formulation, however, contains paradoxes that will need to be addressed and 
clarified. First, if flashbacks are special form of intrusive memories, based entirely on the long-
term perceptual representation system, then analogue research with non-clinical samples cannot 
be generalized to flashbacks occurring in PTSD. Instead, as pointed out by Brewin (2013), 
research on flashbacks should be conducted on PTSD patients who are actually suffering from 
these flashbacks.  The second paradox revolves around the assumption that patients’ most 
disturbing and intrusive flashbacks cannot be accessed voluntarily. This is strange, given that in 
therapy, patients are asked to deliberately recall the most distressing parts of their trauma 
memory, which patients appear to be able to do (e.g., Isaacs, 2004; see also Brewin, Huntley, & 
Whalley, 2012; Holmes et al., 2005). If patients cannot voluntarily access their flashback, this 
would mean that they have no conscious awareness of it after they cease experiencing it. In other 
words, inability to voluntarily recall a particular flashback would imply the existence of amnesia 
for the content of this flashback until a person encounters a potent cue that spontaneously 
triggers the memory. Although patients have been reported to have amnesia for some details of 
the traumatic event, normally in the course of therapy they are able to provide some description 
of their most disturbing and recurring flashback type intrusions. Moreover, several studies have 
asked PTSD participants to provide a written narrative of their trauma event and then to 
retrospectively indicate which parts of the trauma narrative elicited flashback experience(s). 
Participants were able to do so (see Brewin et al., 2012; Hellawell & Brewin, 2002, 2004). 
Having indicated such places in their narrative, patients should be able to deliberately bring into 
                                                                                     Intrusive flashbacks in PTSD 14 
their mind the same flashbacks, if requested. In light of this evidence, it would be important to 
have some discussion in the literature about this aspect of trauma flashback—including whether 
it manifests in therapy and in everyday life as specified by the Dual Representation Theory.   
Avenues for Future Research     
These are clearly interesting times for research on intrusive memories and flashbacks in 
PTSD. The growing number of empirical studies and theorizing in this field, as well as the 
controversy between clinical and more cognitively oriented researchers, indicates that we may 
be on a verge of important breakthroughs and developments in near future. The key to these 
developments, in my view, is adopting a broader approach, as advocated by Brewin (2013), and 
bringing together various strands of research that have been developing relatively independently. 
These include research on involuntary autobiographical memories, on the one hand, and 
research on intrusive memories and flashbacks, on the other. In addition, there is growing 
research situated within the Working Memory model examining the effects of concurrent verbal 
and visuospatial tasks on the vividness and emotionality of negative memory images (mostly in 
non-clinical samples). Below, I conclude by outlining some additional avenues for future 
research. 
Studying Flashbacks in PTSD Patients 
Irrespective of the methodology used and of researchers’ orientation (clinical or 
cognitive), future studies need to concentrate to a greater degree on clinical samples with PTSD 
to study the actual phenomenon in question: the flashbacks. There is already evidence that it is 
possible to achieve do so, for example, by asking PTSD patients to provide a detailed written 
trauma narrative and retrospectively indicate which parts of the narrative (called hotspots) 
brought about uncontrollable visual flashbacks when writing the narrative (e.g., Holmes et al., 
2005). Two studies have used interesting variations of this method. Brewin et al. (2012) exposed 
PTSD patients to words and phrases from their own or other patients’ trauma narratives and 
examined which cues elicited flashback intrusions. Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, and Clark (2005) 
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used the so-called “intrusion provocation task” by exposing assault victims to pictures depicting 
various assaults (bought from press agencies), then assessing whether these pictures elicited 
intrusive memories from their own assault. Both methods elicited reports of flashbacks in 
patients, which indicates that intrusive flashbacks, despite their unpredictable nature, can be 
studied in PTSD patients in much more focused and systematic fashion than previously thought. 
Moreover, the success of these methods indicates that the predictions of the Dual 
Representation Theory can be directly tested on PTSD patients, in addition to analogue samples, 
by using a modified version of a trauma-film paradigm. Indeed, trauma film clips can be tailored 
in such a way that they depict several different incidents that are thematically similar to patient 
sample’s own trauma (e.g., road traffic accidents versus assaults, depending on a composition of 
the sample tested). Immediately after watching the film, participants report which parts of the 
film elicited flashbacks or intrusions of their own trauma, if any, and briefly describe the content 
of these flashbacks. In the subsequent week, PTSD participants keep a diary of their own (and/or 
film) intrusions elicited by the film and the effects of concurrent tasks during and/or after the 
film can be assessed. Of particular interest would be to examine whether the completion of 
concurrent visual tasks during the film reduce the likelihood of experiencing one’s own trauma 
flashbacks and the concurrent verbal tasks increase the chances of such flashbacks (cf. Hellawell 
& Brewin, 2002). 
Diary Studies of Intrusive Memories and Flashbacks in PTSD 
Research on intrusive memories and flashbacks can benefit from using a diary method, 
which is one of the key methodological tools in research on involuntary autobiographical 
memories and has consistently produced valid and replicable findings. It should enable the 
gathering of comparable data on intrusive memories and flashbacks. One important question that 
has not been addressed, and can be studied with a diary method, is to examine the nature of 
ordinary (non-trauma) involuntary autobiographical memories, repetitive intrusive (but non 
flashback) memories of trauma, and trauma flashbacks in PTSD patients by asking them to keep 
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a diary of these memories (using a within- or between-subjects design). It is, for example, 
unclear what role ordinary involuntary autobiographical memories play in the maintenance of 
PTSD symptoms. Is it possible that they are likely to be linked (remotely or indirectly) to the 
traumatic event (e.g., Berntsen, 2001)—and could this further enhance negative mood or elicit 
intrusions about the trauma itself? Another interesting issue that this research could clarify is to 
examine whether the same memory image can sometimes occur as an intrusive memory (without 
the sense of nowness) and as a full-blown flashback re-enactment, in which the patient feels as if 
the traumatic event is happening again. 
Comparing Predictions of Dual Representation Theory and Working Memory Model 
It is particularly urgent to systematically investigate and compare the contrasting 
predictions of Dual Representation Theory and Working Memory Model in order to answer the 
following question: Do we have modality-specific interference effects on the number of reported 
intrusions with concurrent visuospatial and verbal tasks, or are the obtained effects at least partly 
due to more general interference by taking up some central executive resources, as initially 
demonstrated by Pearson and Sawyer (2011)? Or are both modality- specific and general 
interference at play (Kemps & Tiggerman, 2007)? Another important question is to find whether 
the effects of concurrent tasks are mediated by working memory span of participants. For 
example, is it possible that the interference effects with concurrent tasks are more likely to occur 
in participants with low rather than high working memory span? (e.g., Gunter & Bodner, 2008). 
All these interesting questions await further investigation, and the review of Brewin (2013) will 
undoubtedly inform and stimulate this future research conducted by both clinical and cognitive 
psychologists. Together, researchers can solve the mystery of intrusive flashbacks in PTSD. 
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Footnote 
1 It is important that in DSM-5, a similar distinction is drawn between B1 and B3 with 
B1 defined as “Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive memories” and B3 as 
“Dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) which may occur on a continuum from brief 
episodes to complete loss of consciousness”. 
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                                Involuntary                                                                                                                                                 
                                Autobiographical                                               Intrusive                                                                Intrusive  
                                Memories                                                            Memories                                                               Flashbacks 
----------------------------- X ----------------------------------------------------- X ---------------------------------------------------------- X -------------------- 
Retrieval                  Spontaneous                                                       Spontaneous                                                            Spontaneous 
 
Repetition                Low to none                                                       High to very high                                                    High to very high 
 
Valence                    Positive, Negative, Neutral                                Negative, Positive                                                   Negative 
 
Vividness                 Low to very high                                                Very high                                                                Very high                  
 
Avoidance               None                                                                    High                                                                        High 
 
Disruption               None or minimal                                                 Significant                                                              Significant to extreme 
 
Distress                    None to moderate                                                Moderate to high                                                    High to very high 
 
Re-experiencing      No                                                                        No                                                                           Yes 
event now 
 
Population               Normal and clinical                                             Normal and clinical                                                PTSD only 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of different types of involuntary memories presented on a continuum and their characteristics  
 
